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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STANTON TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMpANY, a division of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS,
JEAN DAVIS and JOAN PRESTON, partners, doing business
under the firm name of DAVIS OIL
COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

8951

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this Brief the procedure adopted by Plaintiff and
Appellant for the designation of the parties and others
will be followed. Stanton Transportation Company will
sometimes be referred to as "Stanton"; Continental Em-
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-2sco will sometimes be referred to as "Emsco"; Davis Oil
Company and its partners will sometimes be referred to
as "Davis"; and Walker and Wilson Drilling Company
will sometimes be referred to as "Walker-Wilson" or as
"driller". The following abbreviations will be used; "R"
for the Clerk's files; "TRA" for the transcript of the
hearing of September 20, 1957, and "TRB" for the
transcript of the hearing on November 5 and 6, 1957.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is inadequate and
in some respects misleading.
Stanton is a common carrier, operating under Certificate No. 9787 issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and is primarily engaged in the hauling of oil
field equipment and supplies. Prior to the events leading to this case, Stanton had hauled oil and gas well
drilling rigs for Walker and Wilson Drilling Company
3 or 4 times over a period of about 2 years. ( TRA 7-8,
30-31) The relationship between Walker-Wilson and
Stanton was governed by published tariffs on file with
the Interstate Conunerce Commission. (TRA 8-9)
In Appellant's Staten1ent of Facts (pages 3 and
4 of its Brief) are statements which erroneously suggest
and imply that Davis and the driller contracted for
transportation to the drill site of the particular drilling
rig that was used.
'fhere is nothing whatsoever in the record to support those state1nents. No reference of any kind is made
in the contract to either the particular drilling rig or its
location at the time the contract was executed. :Moreover,
under questioning by Stanton's counsel, ~!arvin Davis
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-3testified, and his testimony is uncontradicted, that he
was not "informed as to the whereabouts of the drilling
rig that would be used by Walker and Wilson Drilling
Company to drill this well", and that he did not discuss
this matter with the officers of Walke-r-Wilson. (TRB 23)
In essence the drilling contract provided that
vValker-Wilson would drill the oil and gas well and
Davis would pay for the well. Attached to the contract
was a Schedule "A" checklist of items to be furnished
by each of the parties, and a Schedule "B" which designated the operations to be performed by each party.
Paragraph 4 of the contract in part provided:
4. In full compensation to Contractor [driller] for compliance with the terms of this contract,
furnishing the items designated in said Schedule
"A", and performing the operations designated
in Schedule "B" hereof, shall pay the Contractor
the sum computed under said Sc4edule- "B" on
the following rates: • • •
d/ For all operations designated therein by
mark "X" in the column entitled "FOOTAGE
DRILLING RATE", the sum of $8.25 per EACH
LINEAL FOOT OF HOLE DRILLED.
Among the operations for which the driller was to
be compensated at the rate of $8.25 per lineal foot of
hole drilled were the following: moving in equipment,
rigging up, drilling and reaming surface hole, drilling
full sized hole, moving out. Among the items designated
in Schedule "A" to be furnished by the driller, for
which $8.25 per lineal foot constituted the consideration,
were the following: complete unitized draw works with
two engines & sand reel, mud pumps, mud storage' tanks,
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-4mud testing equipment, fuel (butane, diesel oil, etc.) &
storage, rig mats and installation, rat hole installed,
water and water line to 50' from well site, water storage
tanks, cranes and trucks for moving in and rigging up,
cranes and trucks for tearing down and moving out, welding on rigging up, portable generator (30 K'V), rig
wiring and lights, drilling mast & substructure, running
supplies & oils and greases.
At the drill site Stanton's employees erected the
rig. (TRA 13, 22, 34) For these services its charges
were $1,244.50. Walter Utzinger, President of Stanton,
testified that these were "freight charges" just as were
the charges for actual transportation. His testimony
in this connection was as follows:
A. I'd like to explain that freight charges.
A lot of this freight charges are essential to the
transportation. In fact all of the1n are. They are
for, they are all freight charges. Even though
they show hourly rates, they are in performance
either in origin or destination for setting the
equipment that has been transported, and are still
transported materials and related to the transportation, and therefore, they are regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Conunission and if they
weren't then they would be subject to- * • •

Q. What I was referring to was that some
of these were for freight charges, that is transportation, Inoving the rig, and son1e of them I
believe you testified were for setting the rig in
place after it was moved on to the location.
A. Still part of the transportation. (TRA

33-34)

•
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.... ---------------------------------------------------5Stanton's charges for the transportation of the rig totaled
$10,984.64.
The trial court found that the charges of $10,984.64
for actual transportation and $1,244.50 for erecting the
drilling rig were fair and reasonable for the labor and
work performed and were made "in accordance with the
tariffs of Stanton Transportation Company lawfully
on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission" (R.
80). The court concluded that Stanton was not entitled
to recover the sum of $10,984.64 representing charges
for transporting the rig to the well site becaus~ "Such
charges are not lienable and do not constitute the
performance of work or the furnishing of materials for
the prospecting, developing, preservation or working
of an oil and gas well" (R. 83). The court concluded that
Stanton was entitled to recover the sum of $1,2·44.50
"representing charges for labor and work performed in
erecting the drilling rig" ( R. 82).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I
FREIGHT CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTING
DRILLING RIG ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER
OUR MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE.
(a) Construction of Statute
(b) Legislative History of Statute
POINT II
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DAVIS AND THE
DRILLER DID NOT COVER .TRANSPORTA~
TION CHARGES.
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-6POINT III
CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF
EQUIPMENT SUCH AS A DRILLING RIG ARE
NOT LIENABLE UNDER MECHANICS' LIEN
LAWS.
POINT I
FREIGHT CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTING
DRILLING RIG ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER
OUR MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE
(a) Construction of Statute

While Section 68-3-2, UCA 1953, provides that the
statutes of Utah should be "liberally construed with a
view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote
justice", it should be remembered that mechanic's liens
are purely statutory, not contractual, and that where
the statute fails, courts cannot create rights and should
not do so by unnatural and forced construction. Eccles
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 U. 241, 87 Pac. 713. As was
stated by this Court in the case of Park City .Ueat
.
Co.,
et al. vs. Comstock Silver King Mining Co., et al., 36 U.
145, 103 Pac. 253 :
All courts agree that these liens are the mere
creatures of s01ne statute, and that unless the
provisions of the particular statute creating the
liens are substantially ron1plied with no lien is
acquired.
r_rhe rules for construing 111echanic's lien statutes are
stated in 36 Am. J ur. Mechanics' Liens, Sections 11, 12
and 13, as follows :
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-7Sec. 11. Generally.-Mechanics' lien ·statutes
are construed in accordance with the general rules
of statutory construction. Thus, such statutes are
to be construed as a whole, so that each provision
may be in harmony with every other, and the
remedial purposes of the law preserved. • • *
Sec. 12. Strict or Liberal Construction.-Although in some jurisdictions mechanics' lien statutes are given a strict construction as being in
derogation of the common law, the general rule
is that such statutes, being remedial, should be
liberally construed in order to carry out the purposes of their enactment. As to the provisions
of the statutes which are not remedial, however,
the majority of courts are inclined to a strict construction. Even remedial provisions of the statutes
are not given such a liberal interpretation as will
unsettle or destroy the rights of third persons
which have intervened. Nor will the rule of liberal
construction permit a claim to be sustained when
that can be done only by a forced and unnatural
interpretation of the language of the statute.
Furthermore, although a mechanic's lien is said
to be a favorite of the law, a statute cannot be so
extended to be applied to cases which do not fall
within its provisions. • • •
Sec. 13-A.s to Classes of Persons, Nature of
Improvement, and Property Covered by Lien.According to the weight of authority, mechanic's
lien statutes are strictly construed as to the class
or classes of persons who may assert the right
to such a lien, the nature of improvements for
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-8which a lien may attach, and the kind of property
on which it may be fastened. ~ • "'
(b) Legislative History of Statute

When the statutes of Utah were revised in 1933
.
'
Sectwns 3722, 3731, 3732 and 37 47, of the Compiled Laws
of 1917 were condensed into what became Section 52-1-3
Revised Statutes of 1933 and what is now Section 38-1-3'
DCA 1953. So the Court can readily determine the effect'
of the 1933 revision we set out Section 38-1-3 in full and
all material parts of Sections 3722, 3731, 3732 and 3747.
Words italicized in Section 38-1-3 were added in the
revision. The language italicized in Sections 3722, 3731,
3732 and 3747, was deleted when the 1933 revision was
enacted.
Section 38-1-3 UCA 1953
38-1-3. Contractors, subcontractors and all

persons performing labor upon, or furnishing
materials to be used in, the construction or alteration of, or addition to, or repair of, any building,
structure or improvement upon land; all foundry
men and boiler makers; all persons performing
labor or furnishing materials for the construction,
repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory
or hoisting works; all persons who shall do work
or furnish 1naterials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas u:ell, or deposit; and
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who
have furnished designs, plats, plans, n1aps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or
superintendence, or who have rendered other like
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have
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-9a lien upon the property upon or concerning which
they have rendered service, performed labor or
furnished rnaterials, for the value of the service
rendered, labor performed or materials furnished
by each respectively, whether at the instance of
the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such
liens shall attach only to such interest as the owner
may have in the property, but the interest of a
lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether
working under bond or otherwise, shall for the
purposes of this chapter include products mined
and excavated while the same remain upon the
premises included within the lease. (All of the
italicized words were added to the 1933 revision.
The language following the first comma in the last
sentence should be compared with Section 3732.)
Sections 3722, 3731, 3732, and 3747, Compiled
Laws of 1917.
3722. Mechanics, materialmen, contractors,
sub-contractors, builders, and all persons of every
class performing labor upon or furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteration, addition to, or repair, either in whole or in part, of any
building, bridge, ditch, flume, aqueduct, tunnel,
fence, railroad, wagon road, or other structure or
improvement upon land, and also architects, engineers, and artisans who have furnished designs,
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys, or superintendence, or who
have rendered other like professional service or
bestowed labor in whole or part, describing, illustrating, or superintending such structure or work
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-10done or to be done, or in any part connected therewith, shall have a lien upon the property upon
which they have rendered service, or performed
labor, or furnished materials, for the value of such
service rendered, labor done, or materials furnished, by each respectively, whether at the instance
of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority or under him as agent, contractor, or
otherwise; provided, that a lien or liens shall
attach only to such interest as the owner or lessee
may have in the real estate. (Italicized words do
not appear in the 1933 revision.)
3731. The provisions of this chapter shall
apply to all persons who shall do work or furnish
materials for the working, preservation, or development of any mine, lode, mining claim, or deposit yielding metals or minerals of any kind, or
for the working, preservation, or development of
any such mine, lode, or deposit in search of such
metals or minerals, and to all persons who shall
work or furnish materials upon any shaft, tunnel,
incline, adit, drift, drain, or other excavation of
any such mine, lode, or deposit; * • • (Italicized
words do not appear in the 1933 revision.)
3732. The next preceding section shall not be
deemed to apply to the owner or owners of any
»tine, lode deposit, shaft, tunnel, incline, adit,
drift, or other excavation when the same shall be
worked by a lessee, under bond or otherwise; but,
in such case, persons entitled to a lien under this
chapter shall have a lien on the leasehold interest
and on the ores and 'mineral bearing rock or dirt
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-11mined and excavated by the lessee. (Italicized
words do not appear in the 1933 revision.)
3747. All foundrymen and boilermakers and
all persons performing labor or furnishing machinery, or boilers, or castings, or other material
for the construction or repairing or carrying on of
any mill, manufactory, or hoisting works shall have
a lien on such mill, manufactory, or hoisting works,
for such work or labor done on such machinery, or
boiler, or castings, or other material furnished ,by
each respectively. And all the provisions of this
chapter respecting the 1node of filing, recording,
securing, and enforcing the liens of contractors
and others, and the word superstructure whenever
it occurs in this chapter shall be applicable to the
provisions of this section. (Italicized words do not
appear in the 1933 revision.)

The gist of Appellant's argument on pages 8 to 14
of its brief is that the revised version of the mechanics'
lien law (Section 52-1-3, Revised Statutes 1933) broadened the previously enacted statutes to provide that work
performed for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of an oil or gas well need· only concern
the property involved and need not be done upon such
property or for the prospecting, etc. of such .property.
This was accomplished, it is argued, by the addition of
the word "concerning" and the words "oil or gas well"
in the revised statute. Because there is nothing in the
revised statute to limit the applicability of the word
"concerning" to liens for work done for the development
of an oil or gas well (and Appellant makes no such contention), Appellant's argument must be that ever since
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-121933 work performed by all persons named in the statute
need only concern the property involved and need not be
performed upon or for such property.

It is our position that the word "concerning" has
applicability only to liens given to architects, engineers
and artisans. There being nothing indicating an intention to restrict applicability of the word to liens for
work done for the development of oil or gas wells, we
can test the soundness of Appellant's argument by applying the word to liens given to other persons named in
the statute. If the word "concerning" was interpreted as
applying to the persons first named in the statute the
following conflict would be produced: Whereas the
first part of the statute gives liens to contractors, subcontractors and all persons "performing labor upon,
or furnishing n1aterials to be used in" (Emphasis added)
the construction, etc. of any building, structure or improvement "upon land", the word "concerning" as construed by Appellant would broaden the act to give liens
to persons whose labor is not upon, and whose materials
are not to be used in, but which only "concern" such
properties.
We submit that if the legislature had intended to
make the sweeping change in the applicability of the
statute, it would have done more to accomplish that result
than to merely add the word "concerning" when the
former statutes were condensed and revised. Realizing
that it cannot base its case upon the mere addition of the
word "concerning", the Appellant tries to establish that
the legislature made other changes in 1933 which, it is
argued, indicate an intent to "specifically provide that
all persons who do work for the development of an oil
well shall have a lien upon the property concerning which

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

... ------------------------------------------------13they have performed the work" (See page 13 of its brief).
In so trying to support its position, Appellant makes a
number of erroneous statements or assumptions. At
the top of page 11 of its Brief, it states that in "1933
the statute was an1ended to give mechanics liens to all
persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the
prospecting, development, preservation or working of
any mining claim, rnine, quarry, oil or gas well or deposit." Appellant ignores the fact that prior to 1933
Section 3731, Compiled Laws of 1917, gave liens:
***to all persons who shall do work or furnish
materials for the working, preservation, or development of any mine, lode, mining claim, or deposit
yielding metals or minerals of any kind, or for
the working, preservation, or development of any
such mine, lode, or deposit in search of such metals
or minerals, and to all persons who shall do work
or furnish materials upon any shaft, tunnel, incline, adit, drift, drain, or other excavation of any
such mine, lode, or deposit; • • •
On page 11 of its Brief, Appellant also erroneously
states that "Prior to 1933, the statute gave liens only
upon property upon which the parties named therein had
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials". Appellant overlooks the fact that prior to 1933
liens were given to architects, engineers and artisans
for furnishing designs, plats, plans, maps, drawings, etc.
describing or illustrating "such structure or work done
or to be done, or in any part connected therewith". (Section 3722, Compiled Laws of 1917) The preparation of
designs, plans and specifications certainly is not the
performance of work or labor upon buildings or improve-
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-14ments, nor is the furnishing of such documents the
furnishing of materials to be used in the properties.
On page 12 of its Brief, Appellant argues about the
meaning of the words "perform labor upon" and the
words "shall do work for", and on page 13 concludes:
"Again, it is no coincidence that these three changes
appear together for the first time in 1933". It is not
entirely clear what three changes Appellant means. Apparently, it refers to (1) the extension of the statute to
oil and gas well properties, (2) the claimed change of
policy to give liens for work which merely "concern"
property, and (3) a change in the language from "perform labor upon" to "do work for" with reference to
development of oil or gas wells. A careful comparison
of the statutes as they existed prior to 1933 and as they
were condensed and revised will disclose that the words
"do work or furnish materials for" were in the earlier
statute with reference to 1nines and mining claims.
A careful reading of the statutes will also disclose
that there has been no broadening of the statute except
to give liens to persons who work for, or furnish materials
for, the development of oil or gas wells and quarries.
Certainly there has ·been no broadening or extension of
the statute to give liens to all persons, regardless of the
classifications set out in the statute, who perform work
or furnish materials which Inerely "concern" properties.
The difficulty with Appellanfs whole argument is that
it is based on the entirely false pre1nise that the legislature, by using the words "upon or concerning which".
jntended to broaden the definitions of all classifications of
persons entitled to liens. Properly construed, the words
"upon or concerning which'' constitute a general description of the types or kinds of work and services performed
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-15by the various classes of persons described in the statute
done upon buildings by contractors, services performed by architects and engineers with respect to, or
"concerning" buildings or other improvements, etc.

~work

Some comparisons of statutory provisions will illustrate our contention that the legislature did not intend
to broaden the classifications of persons entitled to liens
other than to give liens to persons who worked or furnished materials for the development of quarries and
oil and gas wells.
1. Prior to 1933 Section 3722 gave a lien to
contractors etc. who performed labor ~tpon, or
furnished materials to be used in buildings, etc.
There was no change in this classification in the
revision which still provides that "contractors • • •
and all persons performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in, the construction • • *
of any building, structure or improvement upon
land" shall have a lien. Despite this specific
language, Appellant would relate the word "concerning" back to this definition and broaden it to
include contractors, etc. whose labor or materials
merely "concerned" such buildings. We submit
that this classification has not been broadened.

2. Prior to 1933 Section 3722 gave a lien to
architects and engineers who furnished drawings,
plans, specifications, etc., or superintendence or
who rendered other like professional services or
bestowed labor "in whole or part, describing, illustrating, or superintending such structure or
work done or to be done, or in any part connected
therewith". The only change of any significance
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-16with reference to this classification was that the·
legislature deleted the awkward and ambiguous
words quoted above. The classification of architects, engineers and artisans entitled to liens is
the same under both statutes.
3. Prior to 1933 Section 3731 gave liens to all
persons who did work or furnished materials for
the working, preservation or development of any
mine, mining claim or deposit. The revised statute
gives liens to all persons "who shall do work or
furnish materials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit.
The 1933 revision deleted language referring to
mines or mining claims "yielding metals" and
those "in search of such metals". Except for the
addition of the words "quarry, oil or gas well"
the revised provision is essentially the same as
that which was in Section 3731 before 1933. With
reference to the addition of the words "quarry,
oil or gas well" it should be pointed out that in
1933 Section 3736, Compiled Laws of 1917, was
not similarly changed. That provision is now Section 38-1-7, UCA 1953. It provides that original
contractors and other persons must file their
claims for record within certain periods after
"performance of any labor in, or furnishing any
materials for, any 1nine or mining claim. Regardless of the significance of the failure to extend
the wording of Section 3736 to cover work on oil
or gas wells, it seems obvious that the revision
of 1933 did not broaden the classification of persons entitled to liens for work in developing mines
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-17(and oil or gas wells) so far as the question
whether the work had to be done for or upon the
properties concerned or need only "concern" such
properties.
As previously noted, the words "upon or concerning
which" constitute a general description of the types or
kinds of work required to be performed by the several
classes of persons entitled to liens. The statute might just
as well have provided that each of the classes of persons
therein described shall have a lien upon the property
"involved" and eliminate at this point in the statute a
general description of the types of work or services
performed.
POINT II
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DAVIS AND THE
DRILLER DID NOT COVER TRANSPORTATION CHARGES
Transportation of the rig from the site where the
driller had last used it, or where the driller had it stored,
to the drill site was not a subject about which Davis
and the driller contracted. Marvin Davis' uncontradicted
testimony was that he was not "informed as to the whereabouts of the drilling rig that would be used by Walker
and Wilson Drilling Company to drill this well", and
that he did not discuss that matter with Walker-Wilson.
(TRB 23).
The distance that Walker-Wilson had to have the
rig transported had no bearing whatsoever upon what
Davis agreed to pay for drilling the well. For all that
Davis knew, the driller might have had a rig on the
immediately adjoining property-or it might have been
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-181000, or more, miles away. Transportation charges for
hauling the rig from some near or distant point to the
drill site was not an element considered by the parties
in agreeing upon a price of $8.25 per lineal foot of hole
drilled. Among the drilling operations which the driller
agreed to perform, for which he was to receive the compensation of $8.25 per lineal foot drilled, were: "Moving
in equipment", "rigging up", "drilling and reaming surface hole", "drilling full size hole", "reaming and conditioning hole for formation test", etc., etc., and "moving
out". (Schedule "B" of the Contract, Plaintiffs Exhibit
No. 37)

To move in equipment does not mean to transport
it from some distant undisclosed location. To move it
out does not mean to transport the equipment to some
distant undisclosed location. At most those terms mean
moving the rig onto and off the particular property where
the drill site was located.
This Court in the case of Morris on, M erril <t Co. v.
H. W. Willard d!; W. E. Stewart and J. B. Clayton, 17
Utah 306, 311, 53 Pac. 832, pointed out that:
The extent of the right of the subcontractor
under his lien will depend upon the original contract between the owner and the contractor.
The contract between Davis and the driller not having
1nade any provision for the pay1nent of transportation
charges for hauling the drilling equipment, the Appellant
has no lien for such charges.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19~

POINT III
CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF EQUIPMENT SUCH AS A DRILLING RIG ARE NOT
LIENABLE UNDER MECHANICS' LIEN LAWS
Our position in this regard may be briefly stated:
it is, that charges made by a common carrier for transporting a drilling rig from a distant point to the site of its
use are not items which will sustain a mechanic's lien
in the absence of a statute specifically providing therefor.
This position is supported in the Texas decision of
Gray v. Magdalina Oil Co., 240 S.W. 693, wherein it was
held that one who had hauled a "string of oil well tools,
machinery and casing for the drilling of an oil well"
was not entitled to such a lien. In construing the general
mechanic's lien statute, Art. 5621, Rev. Civil Statutes, the
court said on page 694 of 240 S.W.:
The statute does not appear to provide a lien
upon anything hauled, but the person who labors
or furnishes material, etc., to erect any house or
improvements, etc., shall have a lien on such house,
lot, or lots connected therewith, etc., to secure the
payment for the labor done, etc. ; so for this
reason he has no lien.
On motion for rehearing it was also said:
Appellant in motion for rehearing suggests
that the opinion is based upon article 5621, Revised Civil Statutes, when it should be based upon
article 5639a. We are of the opinion that no lien
exists under either article, under the facts of this
case.
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-20This action is against the owner of the well
machinery, as shown by the original opinion. The
owner of the oil, gas, etc., wells is not a party, but,
if it had been, the same construction of article
5639a applies. See McClellan v. Haley et al., 237
S.W. 627, and authorities there cited.
The statute last referred to, i.e. 5639a, as material
here and as set forth in Duty v. Texas-Cushing Oil ct
Development Co., 242 S.W. 495, 497, is as follows:
Any person • • • laborer, or mechanic, who
shall, under contract express or implied, with the
owner of any • • • gas, oil or mineral leasehold
interest in land, or the owner of any gas pipe
line or oil pipe line, or owner of any oil or gas
pipe line right of way, or with the trustee, agent
or receiver of any such owner, perform labor or
furnish material • • • used in the digging, drilling,
torpedoing, operating, completing, maintaining
or repairing any such oil or gas well • • • shall
have a lien on the whole of such land or leasehold
interest therein • • •
It can hardly be said that the terminology used in the
Texas statute, i.e., labor in "digging, drilling, torpedoing,
operating, completing, maintaining or repairing" is subject to more restricted interpretation so as to include less
than "prospecting, development, preservation or working" of any oil or gas well as used in the pertinent Utah
statute.
Since the Gray case the Texas legislature has amInended the statute to provide for mechanic's liens arising from transportation charges. Art. 5473, Chapter 3,
Title 90, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, as
material here provides :
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----------------------------------------------21Any person • * * who shall * * * perform
labor, furnish or haul material, machinery or
supplies used in digging, drilling, torpedoing,
operating, completing, maintaining or repairing
any such oil or gas well • • ~ shall have a lien on
the whole of such land or leasehold interest
therein * • "
The same is true in Kansas where it is provided by
Section 213, Chapter 55, General Statutes of Kansas 1935,
;hat:
Any person who transports or hauls oil-field
equipment under express contract with the owner
or operator of any gas or oil leasehold interest in
real property, or the owner or operator of any gas
pipe line or oil pipe line or the owner of any oilfield equipment and material, • • • shall have a
lien upon the interest of such owner in the oilfield equipment so transported and hauled. Said
lien shall include, in addition to the charge for
hauling or transporting, labor performed, or materials used and expended in the transporting,
erecting, dismantling, loading and unloading of
any oil-field machinery, equipment or supplies
hauled or transported and shall be of equal standing with the contractor's lien provided by Section
55-207 of the General Statutes of 1935.
This legislation we believe is indicative of and in
itself supports the theory which we here propound-that
a special statute is necessary before leasehold interests
may be subjected to mechanic's liens arising from transportation charges. Cf. Green v. Hawkins & Antoon, La.,
142 So. 742.
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-22The case relied upon by Appellants in this regard
Cleveland v. Hightower, 108 Okla. 84, 234 Pac. 614, which
has since been followed in that jurisdiction, held that
under the statute extending liens to "Any labor in constructing or putting together any of the machinery used
in drilling • • • any [oil well or] gas well" gave to one
who with a team had hauled casing a distance of nine
miles the status of a laborer and hence entitled to a lien
for casing used in and which formed a part of the well.
To bolster its position as supposedly supported by
this Oklahoma decision, Appellant cites Cashman v.
Russell, 33 Ariz. 451, 265 Pac. 606, which involved the
hauling of "groceries, lumber, powder, oil, steel, machinery, hay, barley, etc. to the mines as needed in their
operation" and in extending a lien to such services the
opinion specifically excluded in distinguishing Santa Fe,
P. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arizona Smelting Co., 13 Ariz. 95, 108
P. 256, and by citing with apparent approval Union Traction Co. v. Kansas Casualty & Surety Co., 112 Kan. 774,
213 Pac. 169, any question which might arise with respect
to a common carrier. Also cited is Hill v. Twin Falls, etc.,
22 Idaho 27 4, 125 Pac. 204, wherein one hauling cement
actually used in the construction of a dam was entitled
to a lien for his services.. · The very quotation which is
taken from this decision and appears in Appellant's brief
on page 19 discloses the theory of that case to be that
one hauling materials actually consumed in a construction
thereby enhancing its value is entitled to a lien. Finally,
a number of cases are cited on page 20 of the brief to the
point that a 1nechanic's lien for transportation has been
allowed when forming a part of the cost of the materials
transported.
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-23In the first place it cannot be said that these cases
:tate what can be referred to as the uniformly accepted,
1r even the majority, rule. See In re Kent Refining Co.,
~0 Fed. Supp. 662, Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C .
., 96 S.E. 407, 416, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass.
~69, 102 N.E. 428, and 57 C.J.S., pg. 540, Mechanics' Liens,
;ection 50. But be that as it may, we believe that a mere
>erusal of the authorities cited in this regard suffices to
listinguish them from the case at bar. Moreover it has
>een held that transportation charges of a carrier, standng alone are not lienable, Hayward Lumber & Investnent Co., v. Ross, 32 Cal. App. 2d 455, 90 P. 2d 135, and
,he "cost theory" can in no wise benefit the carrier here
Ls the record is totally silent with respect to any proof
)f the "cost" of the rig being affected by its transportaion. Cf. Landreth Machinery Co. v. Roney, 185 Mo. App.
~74, 171 S.W. 681. The same must be true with respect
,o those cases which under dissimiliar statutes have upleld liens for transportation charges when the trans>orted materials, such as cement, have been used in and
mhanced the value of constructed improvements, for
here is a patent distinction, as pointed out in United
?tates v. Hercules Co., 52 F. 2d 451, between lienable
ransportation charges for such materials and charges for
he transportation of heavy equipment which does not be:ome a permanent part of an improvement but may be
1sed thereafter for the same purposes any number of
imes.
We believe that any conclusion other than that
·eached by the trial court in this regard would undernine the very purpose and intent of all mechanic's lien
aws. If it may legitimately be said that this purpose is
o prevent a property owner from acquiring an unjust
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-24_:_
enrichment at the expense of innocent laborers or furnishers of supplies, certainly to permit· a common carrier
a mechanic's lien for charges incident solely to the four
hundred mile transportation of a drilling rig which never
was nor ever would be the property of Davis and with
which the latter had absolutely nothing to do, would
subvert that purpose and work an undue hardship upon
this or any other leasehold owner far beyond any attendant benefits which could arise from the temporary presence of a rig at the drilling site. It is readily observed
that the transportation was in this instance to the benefit
only of the driller, and the greater the distance involved,
the greater became the detriment to the leasehold owner.
If there were a law expressly subjecting a leasehold
interest to a lien for transporting a rig 400 miles, 1,000
miles, or half way across the globe, the owner of such
interest could then by contract protect himself accordingly. But surely the most grave injustice would result
to him were he subjected to such charges upon the basis
of a general mechanic's lien law providing only for
remedies against him by those whom he should have
expected to render services.
We submit that no authority could be cited to support
the position of Appellant and the extent to which it would
now have this Court go in sustaining the lien for the
charges at issue.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's forced and unnatural construction of the
Utah law violates fundatnental rules of statutory construction. Its arguments about public policy and liberal
construction of the statute, if followed and adopted, would
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-25ead to results clearly not contemplated by the Legisla;ure. Appellant would have the Court, in the name of
iberality of construction give a mechanic's lien to a comnon carrier for transportation charges about which the
lriller and the owner of the leasehold interest had not
!ontracted and which bear no relationship to the subject
natter of that contract.
We submit that the trial court was correct in holding
;hat Appellant's charges for transporting the drilling
rig were not lienable under the Utah Statute.
Respectfully submitted,
ANTHONY
CLINTON

F.

D.

ZARLENGO,

VERNON,

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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